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POLIS Report 
Forum on Contempt of Court and Media Publicity 
24 October 2008 
LSE 
 
On October 24th POLIS, the BBC College of Journalism and the LSE Law Department 
jointly held an expert seminar discussing the practice of contempt law. Over twenty-five 
participants, representing the legal profession, journalism and academia, were in 
attendance. Joshua Rozenberg, legal affairs editor for the Daily Telegraph, chaired the 
event.   
 
The issue 
 
The panel’s main concern was to discuss the extent to which prejudicial media content 
affects the outcome of court cases tried by jury. There is concern within the legal 
profession that media coverage of trials directly influences the beliefs and opinions of 
jurors regarding evidence or the person standing trial. If and when this truly occurs, the 
media is guilty of being in contempt of the court because its publicity introduces bias into 
a process that ought to be fundamentally impartial. In theory, jurors must decide the 
outcome of trials on the basis of courtroom evidence alone. Otherwise, they jeopardize 
the fairness of trials and violate the integrity of judicial proceedings. Journalists claim 
that contempt law interferes with freedom of the press and the media’s right (and indeed 
duty) to keep its audience informed on matters of public importance. In light of these two 
positions, the relationship between contempt law and media publicity is particularly 
thorny because it discloses a critical tension between two firmly-held democratic ideals: 
the right to a fair trial and the freedom of the press.   
 
Questioning the evidence 
 
It was pointed out that there has been very little empirical research that investigates jury 
behaviour and whether verdicts are actually influenced by adverse media coverage. This 
is due largely to the fact that juries are sequestered during their deliberation, which makes 
it nearly impossible to measure the true impact of media publicity on their decisions. In 
the UK it is not allowed to interview jurors after a trial. Nevertheless, the panellists 
seemed to agree that there is sufficient evidence to suggest a correlation between the two 
variables. By way of example, they referred to the Taylor Sisters’ murder trial, which 
rendered a guilty verdict that was later appealed and overturned on account (in part) of 
falsely reported evidence in the media. Supposedly, there was a perceived risk that the 
media had skewed the jury’s deliberative process and, by extension, the verdict of the 
trial. Most participants agreed that confusion over current application of the law and the 
risk of media excess was sufficient to prompt reconsideration of current contempt law.    
 
Current enforcement of contempt law 
 
It was clearly a contentious issue whether there is currently appropriate enforcement of 
the law of contempt, outlined in the 1981 Contempt of Court Act. Some panellists argued 
that the law is not being enforced as stringently as it should, but that this does not matter 
because of the “fade factor”. The latter suggests that the greater the gap between the time 
at which prejudicial media content is published and the time at which the trial begins the 
weaker the effect of adverse publicity on the jury’s verdict. Given the fade factor, some 
panellists claimed that media coverage was mostly insignificant to the outcome of trials, 
and that the media should therefore be free to report what they wish.  
 
Another view was that the current law of contempt is being applied loosely to favour the 
media and that this matters greatly because it is severely undermining the integrity of the 
jury system and public trust in the courts and justice. Proponents of this view argued that 
the real problem is not media coverage per se, but that media coverage of court cases is 
so often inaccurate and prejudicial towards the individual being charged. What is more, 
such negative coverage usually occurs before the trial, which means that there is a risk 
that jurors develop opinions regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused before trial 
even begins. It was claimed by some panellists that, in these circumstances, the Attorney 
General’s Office is far too inactive in prosecuting contemptuous media organizations. 
However, it was also pointed out that the Attorney General’s office often acts in an 
informal way to correct media behaviour. 
 
Further problems 
 
Perhaps the only consensus that arose out of the disagreement was that contempt law is 
incredibly difficult to enforce. The reason for this is that judges can do little, short of 
quarantining the jury, to ensure that jurors remain isolated from inadmissible evidence in 
provenance of the media. The question then, according to the discussants, is when the law 
of contempt should be enforced. In other words, when should the proverbial shutters fall 
on media coverage of court cases: at the time of the arrest, the time when charges are 
laid, once pre-trial proceedings begin or once the trial itself begins? At what point does 
adverse publicity from the media become a problem? Panellists agreed that these 
questions need to be further investigated and imperical evidence sought.  
 
Some panellists claimed that these new questions were red herrings given the rise of new 
information technologies like the Internet. They argued that the Internet makes it virtually 
impossible to constrain the free flow of information. Under these circumstances, they 
proposed, it is best to assume that jurors will have access to outside information 
regarding trials. Yet, this assumption undermines the very premise of contempt law: that 
the conditions for fair trials can be created by denying the jury access to certain types of 
information. 
 
Faith in the jury system 
 
In light of the difficulties outlined above, the panellists agreed on a number of points. 
First, the best judges can do in their endeavour to isolate jurors from outside information 
is to continue to warn them that it is impermissible to inform themselves during a trial. 
However, it was added that judges ought to also explain to jurors why doing so is not 
permitted. They should express how seriously it undermines fairness in justice and public 
confidence in the courts, as well as stress that the consequences of misbehaviour are 
dismissal from the jury. 
 
Second, and perhaps most significantly, the panel appeared to agree that in the current 
environment, characterised by information saturation, the only option is to have faith in 
the jury system. We must trust the common-sense and responsibility of jurors to act in 
accordance with the law. We must also have faith that jurors are discerning individuals 
with a fundamental belief in the fair proceedings of justice. As such, we should be 
confident about their capacity to recognize prejudicial information and disregard it.  
 
It was said that academic research tends to testify to the success of the jury system. It 
shows that juries consistently perform well, reaching reasonable verdicts and discerning 
between admissible and inadmissible information. Furthermore, the research suggests 
that the jury system’s inherently self-policing structure successfully creates internal 
pressure to promote integrity: the twelve jurors function as checks on each other, blowing 
the whistle on any attempts to introduce outside information into the jury room. 
  
The U.S. comparison: signs of hope? 
 
Although the predominant focus of the seminar was on UK law, the panellists did discuss 
the issue with the help of an American perspective. The discussion seemed to highlight 
that balancing the right to fair trial and freedom of the press was uncomplicated in the 
U.S. One panellist pointed out that the need to balance two fundamental freedoms does 
not imply that they necessarily conflict. In fact, the U.S. gives both freedoms equal 
constitutional weight. And, despite the U.S. media’s total and unfettered freedom to 
report on trials by jury, it is rarely, if ever, found to be complicit in determining the 
verdict of trials.  
 
The media’s role seems to be more positively, and less sceptically, viewed in the U.S. 
where historical mistrust of government spawned a long tradition of media oversight. 
Accordingly, the U.S model includes a strong role for media in watching over the 
workings of government and informing the public of their successes and failures. It was 
argued that this method of “policing the polices” has often promoted accountability 
without contemptuous consequences. In the tremendously mediatised O.J. Simpson trial, 
the press supposedly played this role to the letter: it never misinformed the public and, 
thanks to its unfettered freedom, it disclosed corruption in the police and gross 
inadequacies in the court system. Above all, despite the media frenzy, O.J. Simpson was 
acquitted. What this allegedly shows is that the media needs to be present in order to 
prove that the political system works and to build confidence in the institutions of 
democracy, including the judiciary. In the U.S., the media seems to fulfil that mandate 
without infringing the fair trial proceedings. Although several panellists remained 
suspicious of an unrestrained media, the American model appeared to temper the panel’s 
overwhelming concern about the media’s adverse coverage in the UK. 
 
Where to go from here 
 
It was agreed upon that the status quo in the UK is unacceptable. The current law of 
contempt must be better enforced, which seems to be a daunting task, or it must be 
changed. It was proposed that law reform be instigated to ban the publication of content 
relating to trials that are under way. However, given that cyberspace encompasses endless 
informal media channels, it is unlikely that such reform would succeed in preventing 
curious jurors from informing themselves. The reality remains that contempt law is not 
enforced entirely because it cannot be. What is left, for now, is to liberalize the 
enforcement of contempt law. This means placing faith in the jurors’ sense of 
responsibility and the judge’s authority and wisdom in guiding the jury. The mood at the 
conclusion of the seminar seemed to be that, if the jury system is to survive - and the 
agreement was that it must - then it will have to be accepted in these less than optimal 
conditions. Unless complete approval of the “unrestrained” American model emerges in 
the UK, it is likely that belief in the integrity of the jury will continue to be tested by 
scepticism in the integrity of the media. 
 
 
This report was compiled by  
Christopher Greenaway 
Polis, LSE    
 
 
